FEBRUARY 12-16, 1862
Siege and Capture of Fort Donelson, Tennessee
Report (#2) of Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, C. S. Army
HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION,
Decatur, Ala., March 14, 1862.Col. W. W. MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.The position we occupied was invested on February 11 by a force which we estimated to be about 20,000 strong. This force had approached us partly by water, but mainly by land, from Fort Henry. I considered the force we had sufficient to repulse the assault of this force. We repulsed everywhere a vigorous assault made by the enemy against our position.
Fresh troops, however, continued [to arrive] every day by water until the 14th. We are satisfied the enemy's forces were not short of 30,000 men. Our impressions of his strength were confirmed by information derived from prisoners we had taken on that day. That evening the enemy landed thirteen steamboat loads of fresh troops.
It was now manifest we could not long maintain our position against such overwhelming numbers. I was satisfied that their last troops were of General Buell's command. We felt the want of re-enforcements, but did not ask for them, because we knew they were not to be had. I had just come from Bowling Green, and knew that General Johnston could not spare a man from his position; he had, in fact, already so weakened himself that he could not have maintained his position against a vigorous assault. Under these circumstances, deeming it utterly useless to apply for re-enforcements, we determined to make the best possible defense with the force in hand.
Our investment by a force of 30,000 men on the 14th being completed, and the enemy on that evening having received thirteen boat loads of fresh troops, a council of general officers was convened by General Floyd, at which it was determined to give the enemy battle at daylight next day, so as to cut up the investing force, if possible, before the fresh troops were in position.
In that council I proposed, as the plan of attack, that with the force in the intrenchments of our left wing and Colonel [R. W.] Hanson's regiment, of General Buckner's division, I would attack the enemy's main force on his right, and, if successful, that would roll the enemy on his line of investment to a point opposite General Buckner's position, when he would attack him in flank and rear, and drive him with our united commands back upon his encampments at the river.
To this proposition, so far as allowing me to have Colonel Hanson's regiment, General Buckner objected, and I waived the point, saying I only asked the assistance of that regiment because my portion of the labor to be performed was by far the greatest, and that upon any success depended the fortunes of the day, and that a very large portion of the force I had to fight were fresh troops and badly armed.
General Buckner then proposed, as a modification of my plan of battle, that he should attack the enemy simultaneously with my attack; that his attack should be against the position on the Wynn's Ferry road, where he had a battery nearly opposite the center of the left wing, and that he would thus lessen the labors for my command and strike the enemy in a more vital point. To this modification I agreed, as an improvement upon my proposed plan.
In carrying out this plan thus agreed upon it became proper for Colonel Heiman's brigade to maintain its position in the line, otherwise the enemy might turn the right of General Buckner's position and take his forces on the right flank, and thus defeat our success. It was arranged accordingly.
General Floyd approved this plan of battle and ordered that it should be carried out next morning at daylight. I then sent for all the commanders of brigades, to explain to them our situation (being invested), our purpose and plan of battle, and to assign to each brigade its position in my column; all of which was done, and I gave orders to have my whole force under arms at 4.30 o'clock and to be ready to march out of our works precisely at 5 o'clock.
At 4: o'clock I was with my command, all of which was in position, except Colonel Davidson's brigade, none of which was present. I immediately directed General B. R. Johnson, who was present, and to whose immediate command Colonel Davidson's brigade belonged, to dispatch officers for that brigade, and to ascertain the cause of its delay. He did so. I likewise sent several officers of my staff upon the same duty. Both sets of officers made the same report, viz, that Colonel Davidson had failed to give any orders to the colonels of his brigade, and that Colonel Davidson was sick. It is proper to state that he was complaining of being unwell when the orders were received. The instructions to the brigade commanders were given about 2 o'clock that morning. My command was delayed in its advance about haft an hour by the necessity of bringing up this brigade.
My column was finally ready and put in motion about 5.15 o'clock. I moved with the advance, and directed General B. R. Johnson to bring up the rear. The command of Colonel Davidson's brigade devolved upon Colonel Simonton, which, owing to the reasons already stated, was brought into column in the rear and into action last, under General Johnson, to whose report for its good behavior on the field I particularly refer, having in my original report omitted to state its position on the field.
Many of these incidents, not deemed essential to the proper understanding of the main features of the battle of February 15, were omitted in my original report, but are now given as parts of its history, In my original report I gave the after operations in the battle of February 15, and shall now pass over all the events occurring until the council of general officers, held on the night of the 15th. The lodgment of the enemy's force in the rifle pits of General Buckner's extreme right, late in the evening of the 15th of February, induced General Floyd to call a meeting of general officers at my headquarters on that night.
We had fought the battle of the 15th to open the way through the enemy's line of investment to retire to the interior. The battle had occupied the day, and we were until about 12 o'clock that night bringing in the wounded. At about 1 o'clock we had all the commanders of regiments and brigades assembled, and given orders to the entire command to be under arms at 4 o'clock, to march out on the road leading towards Charlotte. I had given instructions to Major Haynes, my commissary, and Major Jones, my quartermaster, immediately after our evacuation of the place to burn all their stores.
About 3 o'clock (perhaps a little earlier) we received intelligence from the troops in the trenches that they heard dogs barking around on the outside of our lines and they thought the enemy were reinvesting our position. General Floyd immediately directed me to send out scouts to ascertain the fact. This duty was performed; when the scouts returned they reported the enemy in large force occupying his original positions and closing up the routes to the interior. Not being satisfied with the truth of the report, I directed Colonel Forrest to send out a second set of scouts, and at the same time directed him to send two intelligent men up the bank of the river, to examine a valley of overflowed ground lying to the rear and right of the enemy's position, and if the valley of over-flowed ground could be crossed by infantry and cavalry, and to ascertain if the enemy's forces reached the river bank.
The one set of scouts returned and confirmed the previous reports, viz, that the woods were full of the enemy, occupying all of his previous positions in great numbers. The scouts sent up the river to examine the overflow reported that the overflowed valley was not practicable for infantry; that the soft mud was about half-leg deep, and that the water was about saddle-skirt deep to the horses, and that there was a good deal of drift in the way. We then sent for a citizen, whose name is not remembered, said to know that part of the country well, and asked his opinion. He confirmed the reports of the river scouts. In addition to the depth of the water, the weather was intensely cold. Many of the troops were frost-bitten, and they could not have stood a passage through a sheet of water.
With these facts all before Generals Floyd, Buckner, and myself (the two former having remained at my quarters all the intervening while), General Floyd said: "Well, gentlemen, what is best now to be done?" Neither General Buckner nor myself having answered promptly, General Floyd repeated his inquiry, addressing himself to me by name. My reply was that it was difficult to determine what was best to be done, but that I was in favor of cutting our way out. He then asked General Buckner what he thought we ought to do. General Buckner said his command was so worn down, cut up, and demoralized that he could not make another right; that he thought we would lose three-fourths of the command we had left in cutting our way out, and that it was wrong; that no officer had the right to sacrifice three-fourths of the command to save one-fourth; that we had fought the enemy from the trenches, we had fought his gunboats, and had fought him in the open field, to cut our way through his line of investment; that we were again invested with an immense force of fresh troops; that the army had done all it was possible to do, and that duty and honor required no more. General Floyd then remarked that his opinion coincided with General Buckner's.
Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson had previously retired from the council to his quarters in the field, and was not present. In my original report I stated it was my impression Major Gilmer was consulted, and concurred in the opinion of Generals Buckner and Floyd; but, from subsequent conversation with Major Gilmer, I learned from him that he had retired to another room and laid down, and was not present at this part of the conference; and I am therefore satisfied that. I was mistaken in the statement in regard to him.
The proposition to cut our way out being thus disposed of, I remarked that we could hold our position another day and fight the enemy from our trenches; that by night our steamboats that had taken off the prisoners and our mounted men would return; that during the next night we could set our troops on the right bank of the river, and that we could make our escape by Clarksville, and thus save the army.
To this proposition General Buckner said: "Gentlemen, you know the enemy occupy the rifle pits on my right, and can easily turn my position and attack me in rear or move down on the river battery. I am satisfied he will attack me at daylight, and I cannot hold my position half an hour? Regarding General Buckner's reply as settling this proposition in the negative--for I had quite enough to do with my heavy losses in the battle of the previous day to defend my own portion of the line and I could give him no re-enforcements--I then said: "Gentlemen, if we cannot cut our way out nor fight on there is no alternative left us but capitulation, and I am determined that I will never surrender the command nor will I ever surrender myself a prisoner. I will die first? General Floyd remarked that that was his determination; that he would die before he would do either. General Buckner said that such determination was personal, and that personal considerations should never influence official action. General Floyd said he acknowledged it was personal with him, but nevertheless such was his determination. Thereupon General Buckner said that, being satisfied that nothing else could be done, if he was placed in command he would surrender the command and would take the fate of the command.
General Floyd immediately said: "General Buckner, I place you in command; will you permit me to draw out my brigade?" General Buckner promptly replied: "Yes, provided you do so before the enemy act upon my communication? General Floyd immediately remarked: "General Pillow, I turn over the command? I replied instantly: "I pass it." General Buckner said: "I assume it; bring on a bugler, pen, ink, and paper." General Buckner had received pen ink, and paper, and sat down to the table and commenced writing, when I left and crossed the river, passing outside the garrison before General Buckner prepared his communication to the enemy, and went to Clarksville, by land, on horseback.
I did not know what he had written until I saw the published correspondence with General Grant. It may be asked if I was in favor of cutting our way out, why, when the command was turned over to me, I did not take it out. My reply is that, though technically speaking the command devolved on me when turned over by General Floyd, it was turned over to General Buckner in point of fact. All parties so understood it. In proof of this, General Floyd, under his agreement with General Buckner, actually withdrew with a large portion of his brigade by setting them across the river in the steamer General Anderson, that arrived just before daylight. In further proof of this I embody in this report an order of General Buckner's to General B. R. Johnson after he had assumed command.The following is a copy of the order:
HEADQUARTERS, Dover, Tenn., February 16, 1862.
SIR: The command of the forces in this vicinity has devolved upon me by order of General Floyd. I have sent a flag to General Grant, and during the correspondence and until further orders refrain from hostile demonstrations with a view to preventing a like movement on the enemy's part. You will endeavor to send a flag to the posts in front of your position, notifying them of the fact that I have sent a communication to General Grant from the right of our position, and desire to know his present headquarters.
Respectfully, your obedient servant,
S.B. BUCKNER,
Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.In addition to this, General Floyd was my senior, and of high character and acknowledged ability. General Buckner, though my junior in rank, possessed high reputation as an officer of talent and experience. With the judgment of both against my position, if I had acted upon my own convictions and had failed or involved the command in heavy loss, I was apprehensive it would be regarded as an act of rashness, and brought upon me the censure of the Government and the condemnation of the country. Besides, without their assistance in command and with the moral weight of their opinions with the troops against the step, I did not regard it practicable to make a successful effort to cut out. I declined to assume command when turned over by General Floyd, because it was against my convictions of duty to surrender the command, and under the decision of Generals Floyd and Buckner (a majority of the council)! could do nothing but surrender it. It is proper to say that the difference of opinion between Generals Floyd, Buckner, and myself upon this branch of the subject consisted in this, viz: They thought that it would cost three-fourths of the command to cut out. I did not think the loss would be so great. If it had been settled that the sacrifice would be as much as three-fourths, I should have agreed with them that it was wrong to make the attempt.
Again, I believe we could have maintained our position another day, and have saved the army by getting back our boats and setting the command across the river; but, inasmuch as General Buckner was of opinion that he could not hold his position half an hour and I could not possibly do more than hold my own portion of the line, I had no alternative but to submit to the decision of a majority of my brother general officers.
While I thus differed with them in opinion, I still think I did right in acquiescing in opinion with them. We all agreed in opinion that we could not long maintain the position against such overwhelming numbers of fresh troops as were daily arriving. We all agreed that the army had performed prodigies of valor, and that, if possible, further sacrifice should be avoided. Men will differ or agree according to their mental organizations. I censure not their opinions nor do I claim merit for my own. The whole matter is submitted to the judgment of the Government.
Since my original report was prepared I have seen and read the official reports of General Grant and Commodore Foote. From these reports I learn that the damage done the enemy's fleet of gunboats on the 13th [14th] was greater by far than was represented in my original report. Four of the enemy's gunboats were badly disabled, receiving over 100 shots from our battery, many of which went entirely through from stem to stern, tearing the frame of the boats and machinery to pieces, killing and wounding 55 of their crews, among whom was the commodore himself. There can, therefore, no longer be a doubt as to the vulnerability of these to heavy shots; but it required a desperate fight to settle the question, and there is danger that the public mind will run from one extreme to the other, and arrive at a conclusion underrating the power of the enemy's gunboats.
In estimating the loss inflicted upon the enemy on the 15th, I saw that the whole field of battle for a mile and a half was covered with his dead and wounded, and believe that his loss could not fall short of 5,000 men. I am satisfied, from published letters of the officers and men of the enemy and from the acknowledgments of the Northern press, that his loss was much greater than was originally estimated in my report.
I stated in my original report that after we had driven the enemy from and captured his battery on the Wynn's Ferry road, and were pursuing him around to our right, and after we had met and overcome a fresh force of the enemy on the route towards his gunboats, I called off the pursuit, but in the hurry in which that report was prepared I omitted to state my reasons for so doing. I knew that the enemy had twenty boat loads of fresh troops at his landing, then only about 3 miles distant. I knew, from the great loss my command had sustained during the protracted fight of over seven hours, my command was in no condition to meet a large body of fresh troops, who, I had every reason to believe, were then rapidly approaching the field.
General Buckner's command, so far as labor was concerned, was comparatively fresh, but its demoralization, from being repulsed by the battery, had unfitted it to meet and fight a large body of fresh troops. I therefore called off the pursuit, explained my reasons to General Floyd, who approved the order. This explanation is now given as necessary to a proper understanding of that order. It is further proper to say that from the moment of my arrival at Donelson I had the whole force engaged night and day in the work of strengthening my position until the fighting commenced and when the fighting ceased at night it was again at work.
I did not, therefore, and could not, get a single morning report of the strength of my command. The four Virginia regiments did not exceed, I am confident, 350 men each for duty. The Texas regiment did not number 300 men. Several Mississippi regiments were nearly equally reduced, while those of Colonels Voorhies, Abernathy, and Hughes (new regiments) were almost disbanded by measles, and did not exceed 200 men each for duty. Colonel Browder's regiment had but 60 men, and it was, by my order, placed under Captain Parker, to work artillery. All others were greatly reduced by wastage. The whole force, therefore, was greatly less than would be supposed from the number of nominal regiments.
Of this force General Floyd, under his agreement with General Buckner before he turned over the command, drew out a large portion of his brigade (how many I do not know), by taking possession of the steamer Anderson, which arrived at Dover just before day, and setting them across the river. A large portion of the cavalry, under orders, passed out. All of the cavalry was ordered to cut out, and could have gone out but for the timidity of officers. Several thousand infantry escaped, one way or another, many of whom are now at this place, and all others are ordered here as a rendezvous for reorganization.
From the list of prisoners published in Northern papers, which I have seen, it required the prisoners of six regiments to make 900 men. I do not believe that the number of prisoners exceeded that stated by the Northern papers, which is put at 5,170 privates.
During the afternoon of the 15th I had caused the arms lost by the enemy to be gathered up from about half the field of battle, and had hauled and stacked up over 5,000 stand of arms and six pieces of artillery, all of which were lost in the surrender of the place for want of transportation to bring them away.
In regard to the enemy's force with which we were engaged in the battle of Dover, General Grant, in an official report, says that he had taken 15,000 prisoners; that Generals Floyd and Pillow made their escape with about 15,000 men, and that the forces engaged were about equal. While his estimate of the number of prisoners taken and the number with which General Floyd escaped is wide of the mark, yet the aggregate of the numbers, as given by himself, is 30,000, and his acknowledgment that the forces were about equal furnishes conclusive evidence that we fought 30,000 men, the same number given by prisoners we had taken and agreeing with my original estimate of his strength.
General Halleck, in a telegraphic dispatch of February 16, from Saint Louis to General McClellan, said he had invested Fort Donelson with a force of 50,000 men, and he had no doubt all communication and supplies were cut off. This corroborates Grant's statement, for the troops which arrived on the 14th and 15th, yet, being twenty steamboat loads, had not reached the battle-field on the morning of the 15th, and it is probable that parts of those that arrived on the evening of the 13th had not reached it.
These sources of information make it clear that we fought 30,000 of the enemy on the 15th; and that we were reinvested that night with all the enemy's disposable force, including his fresh troops, cannot be doubted.
Nothing has occurred to change my original estimate of our loss in the several conflicts with the enemy at the trenches, with the gunboats, and in the battle of Dover. My original estimate was that our loss in killed was from 1,500 to 2,000. We sent up from Dover 1,134 wounded. A Federal surgeon's certificate which I have seen says there were about 400 wounded Confederates in the hospital at Paducah, making 1,534 wounded. I was satisfied that the killed would increase the number to 2,000.
As in the absence still of regimental and brigade commanders it is probable that I have not done justice to all the officers or their commands.
To Brigadier-General Johnson's report, which is herewith forwarded, I particularly refer for the conduct of officers and commands under his immediate observation during the battle.
The forces under my immediate command in the conflict with the enemy's right did not exceed 7,000 men, though it never faltered, and drove the enemy from the position of his extreme right slowly but steadily, advancing over 1 miles, carrying the positions of his first battery and two of his guns and of the battery on the Wynn's Ferry road taking four more guns, and afterwards, uniting with General Buckner's command, drove him (the enemy) back, sustained by a large accession of fresh troops. Yet it is manifest that the points of our victory would have been far greater had General Buckner's column been successful in its assault upon the Wynn's Ferry road battery.
Equally clear is it that the enemy, effecting a lodgment in General Buckner's rifle pits, on his right, brought the command and position into extreme peril, making it absolutely necessary to take immediate action, in which we were under the necessity of cutting our way out, of holding out another day, and throwing the command across the river, or of capitulation. My own position upon these several propositions having been explained more fully and in detail in this my supplemental report, nothing more remains in the performance of my duty to the Government but to subscribe myself, very respectfully, your obedient servant,GID. J. PILLOW,
Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.P. S.--That there may be no doubt about the facts stated in this report, I append the sworn testimony of Colonels Burch and Forrest, Majors Henry, Haynes, and Nicholson, to which I ask the attention of the Government.