Book Chat
"Gettysburg, The Second Day"
By
Harry W. Pfanz

This chat took place in the Civil War Home Chatroom on 12/04/05 and covered Chapters 15 & 16.

12/4/2005 9:02 pm (et) Basecat: Welcome to the final Sunday Night Book Chat for the year 2005. Tonight we wrap up our discussion on Harry Pfanz's "Gettysburg Day 2" Let's start this evening on Chapter 15, where we find Richard Anderson's division joining the Confederate attack.

12/4/2005 9:03 pm (et) jimtno: Before Basecat starts I wanted to say that after reading these last three chapters again, I was struck not only by the courage of those involved, but the savagery of the fighting on July 2, 1863

12/4/2005 9:04 pm (et) bluelady: Seems like there was not a lot of communication going on between the confederate brigade and division commanders...Anderson's division acted like lost puppies...fighting mad lost puppies.

12/4/2005 9:04 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, I agree and makes the other 2 days seem like a picnic, compared to this event. Also, folks must remember, there is more to come later on Day 2 on the Union right flank.

12/4/2005 9:04 pm (et) bluelady: Agreed Jim.

12/4/2005 9:04 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...Main problem is, no one knows just what the heck A. P. Hill was doing, or where he was.

12/4/2005 9:05 pm (et) bluelady: Basecat.. the union right...wasn't that pretty much all day?

12/4/2005 9:05 pm (et) bluelady: Exactly...and why wasn't Anderson even aware of McLaws on his right?

12/4/2005 9:05 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...was talking about the night fighting that took place after the descriptions this book goes into.

12/4/2005 9:06 pm (et) jimtno: Robertson mentions they think he was in his tent, so sick he couldn't move.

12/4/2005 9:06 pm (et) bluelady: Ok Basecat.

12/4/2005 9:07 pm (et) Basecat: Part of the problem Blue is topography. Folks will clearly be able to see when we are there in June, just how the ground affected sightlines for the CSA commanders. Major problem on Day 3 as well, and that attack was not as long length wise as what occurred on Day 2.

12/4/2005 9:07 pm (et) bluelady: Jim that seems to be the common belief about Hill...and it seems that that excuse gave him the out from criticism.

12/4/2005 9:08 pm (et) Basecat: Jim...Which is a problem for me, as if he were that sick, he should have relinquished command of his Corps.

12/4/2005 9:09 pm (et) jimtno: BL, I agree with the excuse. What I don't understand is why didn't he let every one know he was out of the fight? His lack of delegation or written orders IMHO just adds to the confusion that exists.

12/4/2005 9:09 pm (et) bluelady: I was trying to see how they were aligned ..at the point where the 2 divisions meet, the ground didn't seem that bad..

12/4/2005 9:10 pm (et) bluelady: Right Jim...if he was too sick to move he was too sick to command...but wasn't he also a vain?

12/4/2005 9:10 pm (et) jimtno: BL, The FNPG maps really show the topography. Its full of swales, and then the gentle slops other then LRT and Stony Hill.

12/4/2005 9:10 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...It does slope off dramatically to the south as well...and had to be a problem trying to keep the momentum of the charge going. Part of the problem.

12/4/2005 9:10 pm (et) bluelady: And maybe too proud man to give up the command at just being sick?

12/4/2005 9:11 pm (et) Basecat: Blue, that and the fact that he just got the job, plays into it as well. Wrong day to think of himself though, IMHO.

12/4/2005 9:11 pm (et) jimtno: Keep in mind folks this is not flat level ground. And also its filled with fences. The same ones that cause major problems on Day 3.

12/4/2005 9:11 pm (et) bluelady: Ok...I think I can see it now...Confederate Ave heading toward the Florida monument is kind of steep.

12/4/2005 9:12 pm (et) bluelady: Good point Basecat.

12/4/2005 9:12 pm (et) Mike: Not to digress, but Hill was also intensely ill in the Wilderness, and also led a very valiant and effect fight in the Wilderness in May 1864. What we see here is a difference between tactical and strategic command. IMHO, the Confederate High Command was much more adept at the tactical side, from its Lt. Gnls.

12/4/2005 9:12 pm (et) bluelady: And those Maine sharpshooters were in the vicinity

12/4/2005 9:13 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...Exactly...Hard time was had keeping his troops together. Florida Monument area is a good place to set up a mind picture Blue :)

12/4/2005 9:13 pm (et) Basecat: Mike...which is a fine point, and makes me wonder why it was different in 1864.

12/4/2005 9:14 pm (et) jimtno: Thanks Mike. You beat me to it.

12/4/2005 9:14 pm (et) Mike: Defensive vs. Offensive, Base.

12/4/2005 9:15 pm (et) Basecat: Mike...You are right. Which makes it more puzzling that Hill did what he did at Gettysburg.

12/4/2005 9:15 pm (et) Mike: Easier to get troops from A to B, plug holes, REACT, on the defensive, rather than look to the offensive, which requires leaders to look more towards the "end game"

12/4/2005 9:16 pm (et) Mike: Basecat, 10 more months in command will do wonders

12/4/2005 9:16 pm (et) Basecat: Also shows what a year does for Anderson as well. Much maligned for his work at Gettysburg, but got raves for getting to Spotsylvania first.

12/4/2005 9:17 pm (et) Mike: Again, folks, I don't mean to digress here, but at GB, the "newness" of command, of promotion, really wreaked havoc, in my opinion. Remember...aside from his experience, Hill was young, very young, and was suddenly given command of an entire Corps. That's big.

12/4/2005 9:17 pm (et) jimtno: Mike what appears to be happening to me is the ANV division and brigade commanders are reacting to what they are seeing, and not able to see the broad picture, which naturally can be caused by the ground, weapons (Smoke) and finally what the other guys is doing.

12/4/2005 9:18 pm (et) bluelady: To go with what Mike just said and was also mentioned earlier.. Hill was just given command...the brigades and divisions were also new to the commanders.. Anderson used to be under Longstreet...and they

12/4/2005 9:18 pm (et) Mike: Jim, bingo. Exactly right

12/4/2005 9:18 pm (et) bluelady: LOL Mike I was basically typing what you said.

12/4/2005 9:18 pm (et) bluelady: So I won't finish my thought...it was already done.

12/4/2005 9:19 pm (et) Basecat: Will just add, during this phase of the attack, Barksdale's efforts on the right of Wilcox were sputtering out, and that had to add to the confusion there.

12/4/2005 9:19 pm (et) jimtno: Finally with Hill so ill, Longstreet just willing to sit back and let the lower level commanders have command and control just adds to the confusion.

12/4/2005 9:20 pm (et) Mike: Blue, another superb point. We have to keep in mind that folks like Hill and Ewell were used to being UNDER the command of very COMMANDING personalities. This is very important. Ewell can work his magic in the Valley because Jackson allows him to. Hill in the Seven Days as well because he has support from above. When given top commands, not all respond accordingly. Incidentally we see this in corporate America all the time

12/4/2005 9:20 pm (et) bluelady: Plus if I go with what the map showed...Barksdale was coming in on the flank of Anderson...had to be really confusion to walk into fire coming to your flank.

12/4/2005 9:21 pm (et) jimtno: BL and then Barksdale goes down, which causes the attack to just run out of steam.

12/4/2005 9:21 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...exactly, and noticed that as well on the map when I read this chapter. Barksdale's boys were also running out of ammo. as well.

12/4/2005 9:21 pm (et) Mike: Let's remember that Longstreet and Jackson were commanding personalities and commanders. If I'm a division commander under Jackson, I have a LOT of flexibility. When I'm now in command, well, that's tougher, and that takes a different set of skills. I actually think that Hill grew into command over time

12/4/2005 9:21 pm (et) mobile_96: Would think most of them were running low.

12/4/2005 9:22 pm (et) jimtno: There is a comment and forgive me for jumping ahead, but Pfanz describes the ANV attack like waves breaking on a shore. A very apt description IMHO.

12/4/2005 9:22 pm (et) bluelady: Right...the peach orchard had to be a very confusion place for both armies to be...and add what seems to be Pfanz's favorite subject to talk about...artillery.

12/4/2005 9:22 pm (et) Basecat: Mike...which just goes to show, the Commanding personalities all took the worst time to have off days at Gettysburg on the CSA side.

12/4/2005 9:23 pm (et) bluelady: Jackson gave his subordinate commanders flexibility??

12/4/2005 9:23 pm (et) Basecat: Jim...I agree...picture in my mind is my Mom at the beach...watching the waves come in and running from the shore so as not to get wet..:)

12/4/2005 9:23 pm (et) bluelady: LOL Basecat.

12/4/2005 9:23 pm (et) Mike: Base, remember how close this was to the pinnacle to the Confederate command structure, with Jackson and Longstreet on top. If, in Europe, Patton were killed in November 1944, Bastonge would have probably ended differently. It's also a question of timing.

12/4/2005 9:23 pm (et) jimtno: Base lets back up here for a minute. Mike has a great point. While Ewell, Anderson, and Hill all grow into their jobs, this is NOT the time for them to have On the job training!

12/4/2005 9:24 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...I told you...I need help.. That came up when I was reading that...and that had to be about 30 years ago..:)

12/4/2005 9:24 pm (et) Mike: Jim, that's exactly my point

12/4/2005 9:25 pm (et) Mike: Had you had another 2nd Manassas, prior to Gettysburg, it may have helped to expose or weed out some of those weaknesses

12/4/2005 9:25 pm (et) jimtno: This is where I don't understand Lee. If you are expecting and desiring to deliver the "knock out blow", why do you reorganize the way you do? Just has never made sense to me.

12/4/2005 9:26 pm (et) bluelady: And maybe showed Lee he needed to change his way of commanding.

12/4/2005 9:26 pm (et) Basecat: Jim...Think it is important to know just how what happened at Chancellorsville affected what happened at Gettysburg to the AoNVA. Plus, a tough time to reorganize an army, and then invade the north. Not a sound decision by Lee, IMHO.

12/4/2005 9:26 pm (et) Basecat: LOL...Seems we all have the same thoughts in our heads..:)

12/4/2005 9:26 pm (et) Mike: Blue, Jackson expected certain things from his commanders, but in the end, he was in command, especially when he was acting independently. There was no doubt who was the boss, whereas at GB, it was Ewell, the subordinate, who was not the boss

12/4/2005 9:26 pm (et) jimtno: To Mike and Base and BL. All great points thank you!

12/4/2005 9:27 pm (et) Mike: Base, yes, yes, yes. In some ways, the victory at Chancellorsville came at a bad time, in terms of reorganizing the Confederate high command.

12/4/2005 9:27 pm (et) bluelady: Well, he really didn't know who to put in place of Jackson...and with the personalities of his subordinates... he had to be careful about who he put over who!

12/4/2005 9:28 pm (et) Mike: That's the point, blue. He had no one. But it was up to Lee to recognize that, that he couldn't expect that same level of independent thinking and action.

12/4/2005 9:28 pm (et) Basecat: Mike...Plus that Victory made them over confident at the worst time as well.

12/4/2005 9:28 pm (et) bluelady: Right Mike, which is why I questioned subordinates under Jackson having flexibility.

12/4/2005 9:29 pm (et) mobile_96: But would he have reorganized if he hadn't lost Jackson at C-Ville?

12/4/2005 9:29 pm (et) Basecat: Anything more on the attack by Anderson's Division??

12/4/2005 9:29 pm (et) Mike: Base, it made Lee far too confident. That was the worst problem

12/4/2005 9:29 pm (et) Basecat: Mobile...Good question, and I don't think he would have.

12/4/2005 9:29 pm (et) jimtno: Mike I think he tries to adjust at the beginning of day 2. That's why the confrontation between him, Longstreet and McClaws.

12/4/2005 9:29 pm (et) mobile_96: Same here Base.

12/4/2005 9:30 pm (et) bluelady: And a second right Mike...which is why in hind sight it is easy for us to see that Lee had to change his style of command...and maybe that is what helped the AoNV in 1864.

12/4/2005 9:30 pm (et) Mike: No, he would not have, mobile.

12/4/2005 9:30 pm (et) Mike: Alas, blue, another point....changing his style of command. He really didn't, which was a problem.

12/4/2005 9:31 pm (et) bluelady: No more here Basecat.

12/4/2005 9:31 pm (et) jimtno: Base, I think the report of the collapse of the 3rd Corps is greatly exaggerated by some, Pfanz makes it clear that almost all the units fought as hard as humanely possible.

12/4/2005 9:32 pm (et) bluelady: Jim and that they were mostly retreating in some semblance of order.

12/4/2005 9:32 pm (et) Basecat: Jim...I agree, just too much to deal with at the time and in a bad position. Reminds me of the 11th Corps on Day One.

12/4/2005 9:33 pm (et) bluelady: You got it there Basecat.

12/4/2005 9:33 pm (et) Basecat: OK...Let's move on to the Repulse...Thoughts comments and questions on that?

12/4/2005 9:34 pm (et) jimtno: Re Pfamz focus on artillery is a key. The reason is that it was used like infantry. The ordnance figures of ammo used by those batteries that day bear that out. Clarke Battery uses over a 1000 rounds of ammo that day. And all of its cannister. Artillery was never meant to be fought that way IMHO.

12/4/2005 9:35 pm (et) jimtno: You know me Base. The 1st Minnesota is just a great story BTW.

12/4/2005 9:35 pm (et) bluelady: Well it seems that the 1st Minnesota wasn't the only lone regiment called on to take care of an attack...but they paid the higher price for their part.

12/4/2005 9:35 pm (et) Basecat: We have talked about the confusion on the Southern side, but the way the repulse was handled shows that confusion reigned on the Northern Side as well.

12/4/2005 9:36 pm (et) bluelady: Too bad Gunner isn't around to pay tribute to his ancestor...wounded with the 1st MN.

12/4/2005 9:36 pm (et) jimtno: The interesting thing I find about Pfanz description its fight with Wilcox is enlightening. Wilcox brigade was coming apart, but the 1st Minnesota hit it at the right time. Just hard enough to cause it to pause.

12/4/2005 9:37 pm (et) bluelady: Well from the sounds and no fault of their own accord the 2nd corps is all over the place and troops that should have been in that part of the line were out correction the Sickles Folly.

12/4/2005 9:37 pm (et) Basecat: BTW..for those who have not been to Gettysburg lately, a whole lot easier to walk the attack made by the 1st Minnesota.

12/4/2005 9:37 pm (et) bluelady: And the time of day helped as well Jim.

12/4/2005 9:37 pm (et) mobile_96: So Gunner's relative stood the ground against my relative.

12/4/2005 9:37 pm (et) bluelady: Sure is...and easy to see the rocks there.

12/4/2005 9:38 pm (et) Basecat: Blue, I agree...as in they had to pay the piper for what Danny Boy did. Does make me wonder why they were not prepared better to do so.

12/4/2005 9:38 pm (et) bluelady: Seems that way Mobile...and it was very touching to take him there so he could place a flag to honor his ancestor there

12/4/2005 9:38 pm (et) jimtno: BL will agree. But when you get down into the swale that the 1st Minnesota gets caught in, Plum Run that is, man what a mess and a place I wouldn't go even with folks NOT shooting at me!

12/4/2005 9:39 pm (et) mobile_96: Had a relative in the 10th Ala.

12/4/2005 9:39 pm (et) Basecat: Plus when they hit Wilcox's brigade, you have to remember those boys had come a long way across that field as well, and had to be worn out.

12/4/2005 9:39 pm (et) bluelady: And Jim to think they did it no questions asked and they could see what was coming at them.

12/4/2005 9:40 pm (et) Mike: Jim, Base showed me where the 1st charged last year....wow, they knew they were in a world of hurt before they even started.

12/4/2005 9:40 pm (et) jimtno: The other story is the 19 Maine. Another Maine regiment that gets ignored because of its fellow comrades from another regiment who get far more attention.

12/4/2005 9:40 pm (et) Mike: Blue, we're thinking alike....scary!

12/4/2005 9:40 pm (et) jimtno: Mike and BL ! LOL!

12/4/2005 9:40 pm (et) bluelady: Gees mike...very scary!

12/4/2005 9:41 pm (et) Mike: Indeed. If I were to quit my job and go into teaching, that would complete the circle! Nothing would please me more....

12/4/2005 9:42 pm (et) jimtno: If you have even seen the picture by Troiani of the 1st Minn. waiting to go in? Some resting on rifles smoking pipes others going to right shoulder shift before the command to fix bayonets and charge. One moment at rest the next............. sighhhhhh

12/4/2005 9:43 pm (et) bluelady: Many minutes of boredom vs a few of sheer terror.

12/4/2005 9:43 pm (et) Mike: Actually, Jim, that seems to be consistent. Look at the photo of the NJ troops prior to going in at Chancellorsville, in front of Marye's Heights, and they're doing exactly the same thing.

12/4/2005 9:43 pm (et) Basecat: Will also add, that Wilcox continued to ask for reinforcements, and yet none came to him. It's an important stage of the battle of this time, and still one of the most talked about events of the entire Battle.

12/4/2005 9:43 pm (et) bluelady: Yes, what DID happen to Wright and Posey?

12/4/2005 9:44 pm (et) Mike: Basecat...dumb question, but in all honesty, what would have reinforcements have added? I'm just curious.

12/4/2005 9:44 pm (et) jimtno: BL and to think a good portion of them are going to die in the next few minutes. Oh my what COURAGE! And a sense of awe inspiring duty.

12/4/2005 9:44 pm (et) bluelady: And the actor Mahone?

12/4/2005 9:45 pm (et) Mike: Oy vey....Mahone went on to fame the next year at Petersburg, at the Crater, and then the following year in March 1865.

12/4/2005 9:45 pm (et) jimtno: Mike, I am one of those who think they would have just added to the confusion and the casualty list.

12/4/2005 9:45 pm (et) Basecat: Mike...Probably nothing, but Just my thoughts on the matter, Wilcox thought he was alone out there, and that attack by the 1st was unexpected. Tend to think he had had enough by that time, and would only go forward if he did get reinforcements.

12/4/2005 9:45 pm (et) Mike: But he was like, what, 3 feet high?

12/4/2005 9:45 pm (et) bluelady: Jim 3 places on the filed of Gettysburg I get that feeling of awe and how and why did they do that...LRT, the 1st MN and the angle.

12/4/2005 9:46 pm (et) Mike: Base, not a criticism, but the cry is always, "REINFORCEMENTS" and in that case, I'm not sure what they would have added. I don't know a lot about that stage of the battle, so I'm actually curious.

12/4/2005 9:46 pm (et) jimtno: BL will have to add, Herbst woods and the 24th Michigan. Ask Base every time I go down there I get chocked up.

12/4/2005 9:46 pm (et) Mike: Boy, I can't wait for June.

12/4/2005 9:47 pm (et) jimtno: MIke, Neither can I.

12/4/2005 9:47 pm (et) Basecat: Mike...I agree with you, but in this case, his call for them was the right thing to do. Not saying it would have changed what happened, and just shows that the communication was bad as well.

12/4/2005 9:47 pm (et) bluelady: I guess each of us has a place on that filed we get choked up.

12/4/2005 9:48 pm (et) Mike: Base....remind me to have you take me to where the breakthrough occurred on the night of July 2nd on Cemetery Hill....but again, I digress.

12/4/2005 9:48 pm (et) Mike: Oh I agree. He should have called for them. The communication was horrendous.

12/4/2005 9:49 pm (et) Basecat: Plus, If need be, more Union Reinforcements would have arrived a lot quicker than anything Wilcox asked for. Gettysburg is Fredericksburg in reverse for the AoNVA.

12/4/2005 9:49 pm (et) jimtno: BL...I think all of us being there together will just add to the emotion and the awe. I suspect we better have a big supply of tissues on hand ! LOL!

12/4/2005 9:49 pm (et) bluelady: Yep and the soldiers of the Union knew that after day 3.

12/4/2005 9:49 pm (et) Basecat: I get very solemn at the mine...But now I digress..;)

12/4/2005 9:49 pm (et) bluelady: Jim...agreed

12/4/2005 9:50 pm (et) bluelady: LOL Basecat....

12/4/2005 9:50 pm (et) Mike: So, I'll go forward again to the Wilderness....wouldn't it have made sense to stack up Longstreet's troops on July 2 in the same way that Hancock did on the 2nd day of the Wilderness. Stack 'em with a short front, but very, very deep. It worked

12/4/2005 9:50 pm (et) mobile_96: Not really Base, AoP did sustain an estimated 50% more casualties than the AoNV.

12/4/2005 9:51 pm (et) Basecat: Gonna be interesting to have all of the crowd together in Gettysburg.

12/4/2005 9:51 pm (et) Mike: As you can see, I think that there was a lot that we saw in the Wilderness that would have paid off in spades at GB.

12/4/2005 9:51 pm (et) bluelady: Oh my and I will say it again.. I hope we have time to see everything everyone want the others to see

12/4/2005 9:51 pm (et) jimtno: Mike have never thought of it that way! Hmmmmm something to talk about and debate.

12/4/2005 9:52 pm (et) Basecat: Mobile, am talking in terms of the charges Lee expected his men to do. One thing about Union casualties in the East, they could and would always be replaced.

12/4/2005 9:52 pm (et) Mike: Given how close the breakthrough came on the night of July 2nd, imagine if there were a brigade front, stacked by division.

12/4/2005 9:52 pm (et) jimtno: Back to the 19th Maine for a minute.

12/4/2005 9:53 pm (et) Mike: Or on the afternoon of July 2nd

12/4/2005 9:53 pm (et) Basecat: Mike...and because it was close, that's why day 3 events was chosen. IMHO.

12/4/2005 9:54 pm (et) jimtno: Base and I have discussed this almost to the point of ad nauseum, but why do you think they do not get the attention that the 20th Maine gets? Even the 4th Maine deserves more attention and they are ignored.

12/4/2005 9:54 pm (et) Mike: Base, how that attack on July 3rd was stacked....I could go on for hours

12/4/2005 9:54 pm (et) bluelady: Because the 20th had a great promotion writer/speaker in its commander

12/4/2005 9:55 pm (et) bluelady: The squeaky wheel gets heard.

12/4/2005 9:55 pm (et) bluelady: Ask Sickles/Historicus.

12/4/2005 9:55 pm (et) Basecat: Jim...Easy answer...Chamberlain wrote a lot about the 20th Maine after the war. Also involved in setting up the battlefield for monuments as well. As you know...one of the most public feuds was the war of words JLC and Oates had after the war was over. That was a huge topic back then.

12/4/2005 9:55 pm (et) Mike: Stack it by brigade, slam in the first, use the second as your exploiter, and the third to get into the rear....hind sight is 20-20, but just my thoughts.

12/4/2005 9:56 pm (et) bluelady: And the fact that Chamberlain as well as Sickles out lived everyone else.

12/4/2005 9:56 pm (et) Mike: Jim, I don't know where the 19th was positioned. Where was it?

12/4/2005 9:56 pm (et) jimtno: BL True...... But there are other spokesman now. There are the LBGs and us! I think we all must make a concentrated effort some how to get their story told. It deserves better!

12/4/2005 9:56 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...Very good point...:)

12/4/2005 9:57 pm (et) Mike: Actually Base/Blue, read some of the correspondence within 3 weeks after the battle. Chamberlain was already starting his defense of his regiment, and his role in the battle.

12/4/2005 9:57 pm (et) mobile_96: Anyone want to write an article on the 19th? I'll post it on my site.

12/4/2005 9:58 pm (et) Basecat: Jim...Thing is...most folks are not as committed to Gettysburg as we are. Family's make trips there, and because of the movie, they know about the 20th Maine. What's the most important feature where the 4th Maine Monument is today. Bathrooms and picnic tables.

12/4/2005 9:58 pm (et) jimtno: I want to say to the left of the 1st Minnesota. They are ordered to lay down by their Col. Humphreys comes along and orders them to stand to help stem the 3rd Corps retreat. Their Col. in essence tells Humphreys to go to h*ll... Gotta love a commander like that!

12/4/2005 9:58 pm (et) bluelady: Exactly my point Mike.  Too many people heard from the 20th and nothing from the others...hard to change folklore.

12/4/2005 9:59 pm (et) Mike: LOL.....Jim, imagine that happening in WWII.

12/4/2005 9:59 pm (et) jimtno: Mobile. I am willing,. I can use Pfanz and the book on the Maine regiments at Gettysburg.

12/4/2005 9:59 pm (et) bluelady: If it was Humphrey's...at least Pfanz was not sure about that.

12/4/2005 9:59 pm (et) Mike: Blue, you just don't hear about the rest of Vincent's brigade, do you?

12/4/2005 10:00 pm (et) mobile_96: Set it up and I'll make a page for it

12/4/2005 10:00 pm (et) jimtno: BL, I would agree with that, but it the description fits A. A. H.

12/4/2005 10:00 pm (et) bluelady: No, because Vincent was dead and the other commanders were not prolific writers like the officer at the end of the line.

12/4/2005 10:01 pm (et) Mike: Yes, blue. Just right.

12/4/2005 10:01 pm (et) bluelady: Yes it does Jim

12/4/2005 10:01 pm (et) jimtno: OK Mobile. Will pull it together as soon as possible.

12/4/2005 10:01 pm (et) Basecat: Hope all enjoyed being a part of this book discussion, and yeah, I know, a lot of info. to get a hold of, I do hope it gave you some semblance as to what happened at Gettysburg on July 2, 1863. I would also like to thank all for participating in all of this years chats on Sunday evenings. Hope in some way you have enjoyed them as much as I have. Sunday Night Book Chats will resume on 108-06. Thanks again all for a fine year of discussion. Class dismissed.:)

12/4/2005 10:02 pm (et) jimtno: Also keep in mind BL, Col Rice 44th NY who takes brigade command is KIA in the Wilderness. Never writes an after action report.

12/4/2005 10:02 pm (et) bluelady: See I had forgotten that or I would have added that too

12/4/2005 10:02 pm (et) Mike: Yes, Jim. Another good point. Although 3 weeks after the battle, Chamberlain was blathering about his role. Why wasn't anyone else?

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