Book Chat
"Gettysburg, The Second Day"
Harry W. Pfanz

This chat took place in the Civil War Home Chatroom on 10/30/05 and covered Chapters 4,5 & 6.

10/30/2005 9:02 pm (et) Basecat: Welcome to the Sunday Night Book chat. Tonight we focus on Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of Pfanz's book "Gettysburg: Day Two". We'll start with comments and questions on Chapter 4 Meade's Scattered Corps assemble, 2 July.

10/30/2005 9:03 pm (et) amhistoryguy: A tremendous amount of information packed on every page, I found myself re reading a couple of times trying to comprehend it all.

10/30/2005 9:04 pm (et) ks: ahg, same here. Read time and again and wished there was a MAP in this section.

10/30/2005 9:04 pm (et) Basecat: did I...and shows just how scattered the AoP was on the approach to the Gettysburg area.

10/30/2005 9:05 pm (et) jimtno: AMg I agree......

10/30/2005 9:05 pm (et) mobile_96: ks, had trouble too, until I found a decent map in Sears.

10/30/2005 9:05 pm (et) amhistoryguy: The information on the value of Capt. Paine, and his map making ability sent me right to the OR Atlas.

10/30/2005 9:06 pm (et) jimtno: I think this is where Meade's orders to make sure he covers DC and Baltimore almost get the AOP in deeper trouble then it was in.

10/30/2005 9:06 pm (et) Basecat: And while scattered most really did not know what had happened on July 1, until they got close to the Gettysburg area.

10/30/2005 9:06 pm (et) bluelady: I was using Imhof's day 2 study in maps as I read today.

10/30/2005 9:06 pm (et) Basecat: Used the maps in my head..;)

10/30/2005 9:06 pm (et) bluelady: That is my first book mark AMHG

10/30/2005 9:07 pm (et) bluelady: Here is a question for you all.

10/30/2005 9:07 pm (et) mobile_96: Blue, will use that book when the big attack starts.

10/30/2005 9:07 pm (et) ks: I felt clueless from the first paragraph. Was the account of the awakening of Cpt. Cavada by someone whose identity I should have known?

10/30/2005 9:07 pm (et) amhistoryguy: BTW Paine began his military career with the 4th WI , and was appointed as Capt. of Engineers by Abraham Lincoln.

10/30/2005 9:07 pm (et) Basecat: ks...No...Just a staff officer in the 3rd Corps.

10/30/2005 9:07 pm (et) bluelady: If Paine was drawing maps for the placement of each corps, how could there have been any misunderstanding of orders by the 3rd corps general?

10/30/2005 9:08 pm (et) jimtno: The picture Pfanz paints there of the morning of that day is just priceless.

10/30/2005 9:08 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...Good question, and only answer I can give is that Sickles did not look at the map, as his eyes were already focused elsewhere.

10/30/2005 9:09 pm (et) bluelady: Yeah, still scratching my head on that one.

10/30/2005 9:09 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...How do you think I lost my hair? :)

10/30/2005 9:10 pm (et) bluelady: LOL..

10/30/2005 9:10 pm (et) ks: "the red sun of Austerlitz" was pretty visual all right, Jim. ;)

10/30/2005 9:11 pm (et) mobile_96: Maybe he did look at the map, but when he saw the lay of the land, designed his own line.

10/30/2005 9:12 pm (et) Basecat: Note of importance that stuck with me, was the quality of the roads in the area, and had no clue that the Baltimore Pike had the best quality. Also seemed to be a lot wider than the other approaches from the SE.

10/30/2005 9:12 pm (et) ks: I was amazed with all of the accounts of reconnaissance done by star or moonlight.

10/30/2005 9:13 pm (et) bluelady: Now Meade's attention was to the already placed line of the 2nd, 1st and 11th correct me if I'm wrong...the 12th is still coming up and being placed at this time?

10/30/2005 9:13 pm (et) jimtno: Base, I was struck by the fact that IIRC, the 5th Marched to Gettysburg, the soldiers marched on the sides, wagons and artillery trains down the middle.

10/30/2005 9:13 pm (et) Basecat: ks...Hard to imagine marching in pitch dark like that...

10/30/2005 9:13 pm (et) jimtno: Geary is originally placed at LRT.

10/30/2005 9:13 pm (et) Basecat: Jim...Did not know that either, but makes sense.

10/30/2005 9:14 pm (et) jimtno: Geary is of the 12th Corps.

10/30/2005 9:14 pm (et) ks: True enough, Base. But imagine being responsible for reconnoitering in that darkness!

10/30/2005 9:14 pm (et) bluelady: Base.. I am not surprised by that due to his destination...Baltimore.. I would thing that the Emmitsburg road would also be ok...destination Frederick.

10/30/2005 9:15 pm (et) Basecat: Blue, Most of the 12th were in the area, and he was in the process of fixing up that part of the lines. IMHO, Meade's main concern was getting the 5th and 6th corps to the area as quickly as possible.

10/30/2005 9:15 pm (et) bluelady: and Geary was moved because danny boy was to take his place

10/30/2005 9:15 pm (et) Basecat: ks...I agree...and as one who does not get lost today, I imagine I would have gotten lost on a regular basis in 1863.:)

10/30/2005 9:16 pm (et) jimtno: And keep in mind folks that the 6th the largest is still over 30 plus miles away!

10/30/2005 9:16 pm (et) bluelady: Right, because those 2 corps were large corps...the 6th being the largest.

10/30/2005 9:17 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, and if I was in the 6th, I would not have been happy, after being told we could go to sleep, ten minutes later we would have to restart the march to Gettysburg, at a quick pace.

10/30/2005 9:18 pm (et) jimtno: Base pardon the drift for a brief moment, Tucker calls it the greatest force march in US military history..

10/30/2005 9:19 pm (et) bluelady: I think for future reference it will be important to remember where the brigades of the 2nd corps were first placed.

10/30/2005 9:19 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, I would put it the top ten of forced marches.

10/30/2005 9:19 pm (et) jimtno: BL, you are most correct, 15000 for the 5th 17000 plus for the 6th (Martin and Busey)

10/30/2005 9:20 pm (et) bluelady: I would think the 6th corps would have put Jackson's foot cavalry to shame that day.

10/30/2005 9:21 pm (et) jimtno: Does Pfanz say how bad the straggling was in the 6th? I cant remember. Brain freeze.

10/30/2005 9:21 pm (et) Basecat: Blue for that one day, I would agree...but Jackson's foot cavalry's marches were a daily occurrence in terms of length etc.

10/30/2005 9:21 pm (et) jimtno: BL, I would agree whole heartedly.

10/30/2005 9:22 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, He makes a point to say there was some straggling in all of the corps marching to the Gettysburg area.

10/30/2005 9:22 pm (et) bluelady: That is why I said just that day.. no match for a lengthy march ever existed in the AoP IMHO

10/30/2005 9:23 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...:) and think how long it took for McDowell's army to get to the Manassas area before Bull Run...and then how quickly they got back to DC after the battle was over..:)

10/30/2005 9:23 pm (et) bluelady: Jim I do not recall any specific to the 6th at this point but it may be brought up later in the book when discussing the placement of those troops

10/30/2005 9:23 pm (et) bluelady: lol.  Very true Basecat.

10/30/2005 9:24 pm (et) bluelady: On the next pages Pfanz discusses the placement of the 2nd corp. It is interesting to see how they were "stacked" in the face of the enemy so to if their placement was not going to be permanent.

10/30/2005 9:25 pm (et) amhistoryguy: The soldier's impression of their commanders, for example Kelley as a father figure, Cross as a tyrant was interesting and didn't always reflect the commander's ability.

10/30/2005 9:26 pm (et) Basecat: Overall, Pfanz does a fine job in telling how the Union lines were set up that morning. Also important to see that Meade was even considering attacking the CSA right that morning. Occupied quite a bit of his time.

10/30/2005 9:27 pm (et) bluelady: Yes. Another reason he wanted the 5th and 6th up as fast as they could.

10/30/2005 9:27 pm (et) jimtno: Base, I was struck by that as well. For a commander who was "cautious" he really wanted at the ANV , but on his terms.

10/30/2005 9:27 pm (et) Basecat: amhg..Have always found Cross to be a rather interesting character...There have been a couple of books out recently that deal with his brigade during the CW.

10/30/2005 9:28 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, especially when his whole army was not up yet...Tend to think he was petrified that Lee would attack him before he was ready to confront an attack.

10/30/2005 9:28 pm (et) jimtno: And guess who is the middle of the recon. (Chuckle).

10/30/2005 9:28 pm (et) Basecat: Anymore questions or comments on Chapter 4?

10/30/2005 9:29 pm (et) Basecat: CSA Left, meant to say earlier..

10/30/2005 9:29 pm (et) mike65: I didn't read the book but wasn't Lee a bit cautious too.

10/30/2005 9:29 pm (et) amhistoryguy: The issue of positioning especially in light of the position of the 108th NY, had me questioning whether the positions were based on the terrain at all, or just by map.

10/30/2005 9:30 pm (et) bluelady: Give me a second to check my book marks.

10/30/2005 9:30 pm (et) Basecat: Mike...That he was...

10/30/2005 9:30 pm (et) mike65: They could have taken the hill on the first day but they held off and during the night the union dug in.

10/30/2005 9:30 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, which is a good point, as Meade did ride around the terrain, but did so in the early hours of that morning...still a bit dark at that time.

10/30/2005 9:31 pm (et) jimtno: One more thing to remember is the restructuring that the AoP corps command has gone through by the morning of the 2nd. Newton now commands the 2nd Corps.

10/30/2005 9:31 pm (et) bluelady: Nope. The rest of my bookmarks were the positioning of the 2nd corps.

10/30/2005 9:31 pm (et) Basecat: 1st Corps Jim. Hancock would shoot you for that remark..;)

10/30/2005 9:31 pm (et) mike65: Why didn't they let them go to the right when they stormed the hill?

10/30/2005 9:32 pm (et) jimtno: Sorry base, meant the 1st ;-)

10/30/2005 9:32 pm (et) Basecat: OK...Chapter 5, as he gets his Alka Seltzer ready..."Third Corps"..:)

10/30/2005 9:32 pm (et) amhistoryguy: The 50 % loss the 108th NY took, just laying there in the way of CSA artillery fire, was tragic.

10/30/2005 9:32 pm (et) bluelady: I was just surprised to actually "see" how they were originally positioned.

10/30/2005 9:33 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, and did not fire a gun back...Worst position on the Union lines, IMHO.

10/30/2005 9:33 pm (et) jimtno: He who's name shall go unmentioned or better known as HWNSGUM.. Chuckle..

10/30/2005 9:33 pm (et) mike65: I mean Longstreet was pleading with Lee but they still went straight.

10/30/2005 9:34 pm (et) bluelady: Well argument was and still is made that the elevation of the peach orchard is higher that the originally assigned position...but also would be more territory for the corps to cover.

10/30/2005 9:35 pm (et) Basecat: Takes a deep breath, and here I go...Sickles seems to feel he is being left on his own on the left of the Union Lines. Notice not one mention of him inquiring as to the arrival of the 5th or 6th corps.

10/30/2005 9:35 pm (et) jimtno: Mike you should read Pfanzs book on Culp's Hill. Cemetery Hill .. the best book on that forgotten end of the field.

10/30/2005 9:36 pm (et) bluelady: About the only thing he was right about was no cavalry support in his left.

10/30/2005 9:36 pm (et) jimtno: BL True. And when you walk the ground, you find yourself scratching your head and thinking , what in the world was he thinking?

10/30/2005 9:36 pm (et) mike65: I just was wondering why they didn't let them go right.

10/30/2005 9:37 pm (et) Basecat: Blue, and Hunt points that out to Sickles, or was about to, when he rode off to check on the arty. In Sickles's defense, Meade should have found Warren, and told him to ride with Sickles to that area.

10/30/2005 9:37 pm (et) mike65: They knew that they were not going to go up that hill at that position.

10/30/2005 9:37 pm (et) bluelady: Now another thing to put a damper on it was that Hunt even told him that it would take more than his corps to hold that area...the only reason in his mind for even going there.

10/30/2005 9:38 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Almost as if the positioning was defensive in nature, but with an eye to offensive maneuvering?

10/30/2005 9:38 pm (et) Basecat: Mike...You talking about Day One?? If so, just wanted to say we are talking day 2 here.

10/30/2005 9:39 pm (et) mike65: I have my days mixed sorry

10/30/2005 9:39 pm (et) jimtno: AMG, I am one of those who think he had Chancellorsville and what happened to him on his mind.

10/30/2005 9:39 pm (et) ks: Mike, those aren't bad questions. Just aren't really what is covered in the chapters we're currently trying to discuss of Pfanz's book.

10/30/2005 9:40 pm (et) bluelady: JIm I agree with you there...and especially so after Hunt left him with his comment.. not on my orders.

10/30/2005 9:40 pm (et) Basecat: Blue, and what Hunt noticed, and Sickles did not...the gap in the lines between the 2nd and 3rd Corps if he made that move.

10/30/2005 9:41 pm (et) bluelady: Yes. That as well.

10/30/2005 9:41 pm (et) jimtno: The 3rd had 11924 ready for duty equipped. No way he can cover the section he supposed to with what he had.

10/30/2005 9:41 pm (et) Basecat: amhg...Which has always boggled the mind here, as the highest points in his sector of the line are the Round Tops, and yet he barely acknowledged them.

10/30/2005 9:41 pm (et) mobile_96: So why didn't Hunt point that out to Sickles?

10/30/2005 9:42 pm (et) jimtno: I was struck that I think its Birney with his division, is to cover from Devils Den to the the Peach Orchard,. RIGHT!

10/30/2005 9:42 pm (et) mike65: Did the thing with Chamberlain happen on the second day or the third?

10/30/2005 9:42 pm (et) Basecat: Mobile...Only reason I can think off, and as pointed out in the book, he left to attend to the arty.

10/30/2005 9:42 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Makes sense, but it seemed a formula for dependence upon the independent actions of subordinates to hold great weight in the upcoming battle.

10/30/2005 9:42 pm (et) bluelady: Now one thing that I think you will all be able to see if I could see it was the view from the J. Weikert farm...almost NO difference in elevation at that point and also less than half the territory to have to defend and your flanks would be protected and anchored on both sides.. I need not go on .

10/30/2005 9:43 pm (et) jimtno: That's second day Mike but later in this book. Hang in there bud. We will get there.

10/30/2005 9:43 pm (et) Basecat: Mike, We have not gotten to the part JLC was to play in Day 2.

10/30/2005 9:43 pm (et) mobile_96: Think he is at fault for rushing off without an explanation.

10/30/2005 9:44 pm (et) Basecat: Mobile...I agree...Hunt did not handle that well at all...Bad communication.

10/30/2005 9:44 pm (et) bluelady: Mobile I think he did say it and thought it was understood but then heard the sound of Artillery...and was needed elsewhere.

10/30/2005 9:45 pm (et) mike65: I am so messed up I think I am going to go and wait for A chat that I can stay with. See ya'll.

10/30/2005 9:45 pm (et) jimtno: I think what also got me is that he is repeatedly told from Hunt to Meade jr to Warren . No you cannot post there...... I think even a thick headed politico like Sickles would understand NO! Geeezzzz ;-)

10/30/2005 9:46 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, or understand that the recon he ordered clearly showed CSA troops massing just west of that position.

10/30/2005 9:46 pm (et) jimtno: Mike why not stay and learn something.

10/30/2005 9:46 pm (et) bluelady: and if he thought he was not being understood, why would he not seek out Butterfield is supposed cronie to get results?

10/30/2005 9:47 pm (et) jimtno: Finally he shows up at Meade's HQ, just in time for the opening rounds of Artillery. Can imagine the look on Meade's face......

10/30/2005 9:47 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...which is a good point. Am guessing Meade would not have listened to Butterfield either, as they did not get along at all.

10/30/2005 9:47 pm (et) mike65: I guess that might be fun.

10/30/2005 9:48 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Egos and personalities again.

10/30/2005 9:48 pm (et) bluelady: No but he did keep him on as his chief of staff for this battle at least.. and Butterfield could have gone at it adnausium.

10/30/2005 9:48 pm (et) Basecat: Another thing I will add, Meade's son...New to the staff, and really did a bad job explaining what his Dad wanted Sickles to do, as Pfanz points out.

10/30/2005 9:49 pm (et) jimtno: MIke, just as an aside, we are about 4pm in the afternoon on July 2,1863 The 3rd Corps with flags flying moves WEST to what Sickles the Corps commander thinks is better ground to defend.

10/30/2005 9:49 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...Main reason he time...IIRC, he replaced him right after the battle with Humphries.

10/30/2005 9:49 pm (et) Basecat: Jim...earlier than that...about 2 PM.

10/30/2005 9:49 pm (et) ks: "Bad" as in he didn't repeat, and make clear but instead went running back to Dad to report?

10/30/2005 9:49 pm (et) Basecat: He hasn't made the main move yet..:)

10/30/2005 9:49 pm (et) bluelady: Oh I know that.. but just one of those hindsight things.

10/30/2005 9:50 pm (et) jimtno: BL, Keep in mind the Meade had offered it to Warren among others. ALL said no.

10/30/2005 9:50 pm (et) Basecat: ks...Exactly...Think he got flummoxed, and rode back to talk to his Dad.

10/30/2005 9:50 pm (et) jimtno: See Mike even I just learned something! :-)

10/30/2005 9:50 pm (et) bluelady: Right ks. An officer with more experience would have made the point perfectly clear.

10/30/2005 9:51 pm (et) Basecat: BTW...when we are out there, hope to show you all just how far the Sharpshooters advanced on that day when they made that recon..It will surprise you.

10/30/2005 9:52 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Unless the young Meade didn't understand clearly.

10/30/2005 9:52 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, That too...Think it is part of the problem.

10/30/2005 9:52 pm (et) bluelady: yeah all the way to that travesty of a statue.. Longstreet.

10/30/2005 9:52 pm (et) ks: The accounts of the sharpshooters were what stood out as most interesting to me in the reading for this evening. That and footnotes on monument placement. ;)

10/30/2005 9:52 pm (et) Basecat: and beyond it Blue..:)

10/30/2005 9:52 pm (et) bluelady: The sharpshooters that is.

10/30/2005 9:53 pm (et) jimtno: I would like to back up a minute. How old is the younger Meade? And he goes to a Corps commander. Even though Daddy is the BOSS, can imagine some intimidation there.

10/30/2005 9:53 pm (et) Basecat: Early 20s Jim.

10/30/2005 9:53 pm (et) bluelady: AMHG.. I thought that as well.

10/30/2005 9:54 pm (et) amhistoryguy: The use of the sharpshooters was very interesting ks.

10/30/2005 9:54 pm (et) jimtno: And IIRC the 3rd Maine as well.

10/30/2005 9:54 pm (et) Basecat: Hope you all looked at the note that ks mentioned, as it showed how many states those sharpshooters were from.

10/30/2005 9:55 pm (et) jimtno: Ks good point. They were surely an elite force.

10/30/2005 9:55 pm (et) Basecat: Know next week the real agita on Sickles will be revealed, so any more comments on this Chapter?

10/30/2005 9:56 pm (et) jimtno: Not from me;-)

10/30/2005 9:56 pm (et) bluelady: not from here

10/30/2005 9:57 pm (et) Basecat: OK then On to the "Confederate Preparations"...where we find out what Lee was thinking..:)

10/30/2005 9:57 pm (et) amhistoryguy: One of the sharpshooters from WI has his letters published " Letters from a Sharpshooter," Letters of William B. Greene, Co. G. Berdan's Sharpshooters.

10/30/2005 9:58 pm (et) bluelady: Or in other words...Longstreet's counter march as well?

10/30/2005 9:58 pm (et) bluelady: But I get ahead of myself.

10/30/2005 9:58 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...I like the recons that really were not recons at all..;)

10/30/2005 9:58 pm (et) jimtno: Or better known as "How to do lousy recon and then get the whole army in trouble with it".

10/30/2005 9:59 pm (et) bluelady: I am amazed that Lee really had a plan for Anderson's division...even on day 2 was looking to break the center.

10/30/2005 9:59 pm (et) bluelady: and then says Mclaws this, "can I go?" Longstreet, "no you can't."  Mclaws again,  "can I go?" Longstreet again, "no you can't!"  hehe

10/30/2005 9:59 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, which brings to mind that even today, no one can pinpoint exactly when they were done..

10/30/2005 10:01 pm (et) bluelady: I remember being given a tour on the countermarch about 4 years ago...and the hindsight futility of it since their movements were detected long before they reached that point where they could see the Roundtops.

10/30/2005 10:02 pm (et) Basecat: Point to consider when reading this part of the book, just what did the Cavalry do on either side??? On the Union side you had part of the Third Corps protecting the rear of the AoP. On the Confederate side, Pickett's whole division was still in the Chambersburg area guarding Lee's rear...Monumental gaffes by both sides, and really affects the battle, IMHO.

10/30/2005 10:02 pm (et) bluelady: Also I think I recall reading that Porter Alexander had some recon done that would allow them to continue the southerly direction and still not be seen.

10/30/2005 10:03 pm (et) bluelady: I'm trying to think what Lee did with the cavalry he still had with him... you never hear about them.

10/30/2005 10:03 pm (et) Basecat: Blue, the thing about the recon's that makes no sense...all saying they saw no Union troops in the area...Makes me wonder just how far to the right they actually went.

10/30/2005 10:03 pm (et) jimtno: Or Genl Lee, "Gnl McLaws I wish you to place your troops here." Genl Longstreet, "No genl, place them here"... Back and fourth they go.. Man that had to be EMBARRASSING for McLaws.

10/30/2005 10:04 pm (et) bluelady: And yet there were troops who could see the sharpshooters from Pitzer's woods.

10/30/2005 10:05 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, and the need for secrecy also has bothered me...Waste of time, IMHO.

10/30/2005 10:05 pm (et) bluelady: Jim...I was hoping Pfanz would have explained that exchange a bit more...was that part of the Lee Longstreet disagreement?

10/30/2005 10:05 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Did the natural shield of terrain and the distance over which both armies were spread out have an affect on the use of cavalry?

10/30/2005 10:06 pm (et) bluelady: but Lee ordered the that I did not know before.. I thought that was all Longstreet's idea

10/30/2005 10:06 pm (et) jimtno: I don't want to get off this book, but Tucker goes into this exchange in Lee and Longstreet at Gettysburg.

10/30/2005 10:07 pm (et) bluelady: amhg.. I think lee's mistrust of those left him had everything to do with the confederate side.. what ailed the Union side is unknown to me...maybe lack of direction from the commanding general?

10/30/2005 10:07 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, In my mind...No. They just were not used properly. Pleasonton ordering Buford to Westminster to refit, and then not sending any replacements over there adds to the paranoia felt by Sickles. Lee was more worried about the Stuarts whereabouts, than using the cavalry he had at his disposal to do a more thorough recon on the left of the Union lines.

10/30/2005 10:08 pm (et) bluelady: There...Basecat said it better than I did AMHG.

10/30/2005 10:09 pm (et) jimtno: I was just thinking about that Base. Imoden who Lee will trust with the ANVs very existence on the retreat, he doesn't even consider using them till July 4th. Go figure.

10/30/2005 10:10 pm (et) bluelady: Imboden's command was not attached to Stuart IIRC?

10/30/2005 10:10 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, which is a fine point, as he sure put a lot of trust in him on the retreat...In fact demanded no mistakes from him at all.

10/30/2005 10:10 pm (et) jimtno: BL that's right IIRC.

10/30/2005 10:11 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...No, he was with the army as was Grumble Jones's cavalry brigade.

10/30/2005 10:11 pm (et) amhistoryguy: It makes trying to figure out the "whys" more difficult when what would seem to be a reasonable course of action, just slips by unnoticed. Like why wasn't the cavalry used.

10/30/2005 10:12 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, :) Can I copy this and use it as my official statement to my family as to why I am going to Gettysburg all the time...:)

10/30/2005 10:12 pm (et) mobile_96: Maybe Lee didn't even think he had cavalry without Stuart around to lead them?

10/30/2005 10:12 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Feel free Basecat, let me know if it works.

10/30/2005 10:13 pm (et) jimtno: AMHG, This is why I along with Base keep going back. Got asked again tonight , why do you keep going back? Sighhhhhh

10/30/2005 10:13 pm (et) bluelady: Basecat.. in looking at the order of battle at the end of the book Pfanz does not have Imboden attached to Jones.

10/30/2005 10:14 pm (et) bluelady: LOL to both of you.. I don't need an excuses I just go! hehe

10/30/2005 10:15 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...You're right...a separate for the Cavalry with Lee, Robertson, Jenkin's, and Jones's brigades...

10/30/2005 10:15 pm (et) Basecat: Plus Imboden's command.

10/30/2005 10:16 pm (et) bluelady: And not a one used for recon.

10/30/2005 10:18 pm (et) jimtno: BL, this is one of those little known parts of the battle and a question I think just continues to nag at those of us who are trying to understand why this preoccupation with Stuarts status when he had that much Horse soldiers with him. Go figure.

10/30/2005 10:19 pm (et) amhistoryguy: The impression both Lee and Meade had, of being forced into battle, perhaps betrays their impression that they were not in control of the situation, and did not have a particular need for much in the way of recon? Just a thought.

10/30/2005 10:21 pm (et) bluelady: And one I think we will never really know. Lee never said much about this after the battle and even after the war. Jenkins, Jones and Robertson didn't leave much on it either... you would think they would have been steamed.

10/30/2005 10:21 pm (et) mobile_96: amhg, figure that would cause them to do More recon, to try and see if they could get Control.

10/30/2005 10:21 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...Main reason why Jones did not leave anything , he was killed after Gettysburg.

10/30/2005 10:21 pm (et) jimtno: Ah yes, Longstreet's ring around the rousy. or how to get discovered by the Union troops without really trying.

10/30/2005 10:21 pm (et) bluelady: amhg.. I would think that very reason would be a real need for recon to gain control of the situation.

10/30/2005 10:22 pm (et) bluelady: oops...well my bad there.

10/30/2005 10:23 pm (et) jimtno: Ok One of the things that I have always found interesting. Why not just let those in the rear lead and the troops in the lead just about face and follow . Nope they have to halt and let Hoods boys regain the lead.

10/30/2005 10:23 pm (et) bluelady: Well Jim... as I said earlier that was all for naught as they were seen leaving Herr's Ridge IIRC.

10/30/2005 10:23 pm (et) amhistoryguy: I would have thought that too Mobile and Bluelady, but since they both seem to make the same blunder, the same circumstances might lead to it. That was my thought.

10/30/2005 10:24 pm (et) bluelady: Wait Jim.. I thought that McLaws had the lead and with the countermarch Hood's people had to go by McLaws to get to their position adding even more time.

10/30/2005 10:25 pm (et) jimtno: BL, They are also spotted by the Signalmen on LRT. But they report the ANV seems to be going NORTH.

10/30/2005 10:25 pm (et) jimtno: BL, My bad. Brain freeze.

10/30/2005 10:25 pm (et) bluelady: Ah ok, but movement was detected.

10/30/2005 10:26 pm (et) jimtno: BL, Yep and then Longstreet's anger at the line of march being exposed after all, and Johnson's response in essence, but I didn't know I was to lead you Genl. Ah hem right......

10/30/2005 10:27 pm (et) bluelady: Now to go with your wondering...why not have McLaws take Hood's position and vice versa.. since the march changed everything else.

10/30/2005 10:28 pm (et) bluelady: Right. Then why would you be a ...scout... hehe

10/30/2005 10:28 pm (et) bluelady: Sounds like he was trying to save face there

10/30/2005 10:28 pm (et) jimtno: BL, Army protocol., You know the manly kind of thing. " We are leading and will continue to lead even though it messes everything up".

10/30/2005 10:29 pm (et) jimtno: BL I agree with you there. He insists that he didn't know he was actually GUIDING Longstreet's Corps.

10/30/2005 10:30 pm (et) bluelady: All reasons and placement aside.. suffice it to say that this march and subsequent placement delayed Longstreet at least, IMHO, a good 3 hours.

10/30/2005 10:30 pm (et) bluelady: He could have been in place by noon otherwise and then all you know what would have happened.

10/30/2005 10:30 pm (et) jimtno: Longstreet by now is in such a snit because remember he doesn't want to do this attack in the first place (See earlier meeting).

10/30/2005 10:31 pm (et) bluelady: At least danny boy would have been where he was supposed to be...well maybe.

10/30/2005 10:31 pm (et) bluelady: Tight Jim and makes me wonder how much of this was his pouting?

10/30/2005 10:31 pm (et) jimtno: Bl And there you have the rest of the story. For the want of shoe the horse was lost, for want of horse, the commander was lost for want of a commander the battle was lost.

10/30/2005 10:32 pm (et) Basecat: Will add a point here on the secrecy of the march prior to the launching of the attack. Used quite a bit before by Lee as you know, but against lesser commanders of the AoP. Meade was not going anywhere, and would be more prepared for a move like unlike his predecessor Hooker. Not saying Lee could have won at Gettysburg, but this farce adds to the odds of him losing. Wasted a lot of time...and one has to wonder what would have happened if say the attack was launched right as Sickles was moving his corps to his new position.

10/30/2005 10:32 pm (et) bluelady: Mind you, I really do like Longstreet...but he could be moody especially at this time of the war.. I really think he was clinically depressed...and that had to have an effect.

10/30/2005 10:33 pm (et) bluelady: Like I said Basecat... all you know what would have happened.

10/30/2005 10:35 pm (et) jimtno: All can you imagine the consternation in the 1st Corps command structure of the ANV by now? What they find is the 3rd Corps now posted in a strong position with artillery in place. A paraphrase of their words.

10/30/2005 10:36 pm (et) jimtno: All the secrecy, all the marching and counter marching, all for naught...... And the time wasted.

10/30/2005 10:36 pm (et) Basecat: As all can see, these 3 chapters had a lot of info. packed in them, and main reason why the homework is being scaled down to 2 chapters next week. It really is a fascinating book, and a lot better to understand than Pfanz's day one book. Hope all are getting the picture in their heads as to the preparations of Day 2, and know it will make more sense when we walk the ground down there in June 2006. Homework for next week is Chapters 7, and 8. Thanks all for a wonderful chat this evening, and also one of the longest time wise we have had on a Sunday night..:)