Book Chat
"Gettysburg, The Second Day"
By
Harry W. Pfanz

This chat took place in the Civil War Home Chatroom on 10/23/05 and covered Chapters 1,2,& 3

10/23/2005 9:06 pm (et) Basecat: And on that Note...Welcome to the Sunday Night Book Chat. Tonight we will be discussing the first 3 Chapters of Pfanz's book Gettysburg Day 2. Any thoughts on the first chapter "From the Potomac to Pennsylvania"?

10/23/2005 9:06 pm (et) bluelady: Well, in 1991 I was fresh off Ken Burns and really wanted to find out more about the closest battlefield to me...and this book was on the shelf.

10/23/2005 9:07 pm (et) Basecat: ks, I agree with you. Found it a lot easier to read...and less confusing.

10/23/2005 9:07 pm (et) amhistoryguy: I was surprised that Meade, as a professional soldier, was so reluctant to assume command - does this indicate a problem in command structure?

10/23/2005 9:08 pm (et) bluelady: If I recall, he wrote this one before the day one book. I will say he gave us a background easily understood as to the campaign before the battle.

10/23/2005 9:08 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, I tend to believe that the timing of the change in command put him in a bad predicament...and main reason why he at first declined it.

10/23/2005 9:09 pm (et) Basecat: 14 Years before the Day One Book Blue...and notice the directions were easier to follow.:)

10/23/2005 9:09 pm (et) ks: My first comment/question comes from the Preface. I'd never read previously that the practice of identifying corps by using Roman numerals was NOT in use at the time of the CW. That confused the heck out of me.

10/23/2005 9:09 pm (et) bluelady: amhg, my opinion is that he thought it was going to be like what happened to the others...they were controlled by Washington as to how to move and seemingly when

10/23/2005 9:09 pm (et) ks: Was that news to anyone else??

10/23/2005 9:10 pm (et) Basecat: ks.. First time I have ever read that as well, so I have no clue whether he is right about that.

10/23/2005 9:10 pm (et) bluelady: ks yes

10/23/2005 9:10 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Bluelady, so he was afraid of how taking command would affect his career?

10/23/2005 9:10 pm (et) Basecat: 99 % of books here designate corps by Roman Numerals.

10/23/2005 9:11 pm (et) ks: Well he is/was certainly someone who SHOULD know what he's talking about on the subject. The retired Chief Historian at Gettysburg is a creditable source. :)

10/23/2005 9:11 pm (et) bluelady: I think so amhg...and of the politics involved.

10/23/2005 9:11 pm (et) Basecat: ks...True...will have to ask JD, as he would know for sure.

10/23/2005 9:11 pm (et) ks: I know! So I started this book with a huge surprise. :)

10/23/2005 9:11 pm (et) mobile_96: Wonder if they was designated that way by the authors.

10/23/2005 9:12 pm (et) Basecat: Again, I just think he did not want it, because of the impending battle that loomed...Tough position he was put in .

10/23/2005 9:12 pm (et) amhistoryguy: I would have thought that would have sent a message to the politicians - we can't get our best leaders to lead because of our meddling.

10/23/2005 9:13 pm (et) bluelady: That may be and I just thought of this.. it could be confusing by using regiment numbers in arabic #s so corp #s were roman.

10/23/2005 9:13 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Basecat, as a professional soldier, I would have thought he would have wanted "to be given the ball, " when the game was on the line.

10/23/2005 9:13 pm (et) bluelady: amhg... I think that was soon to come when grant came east.

10/23/2005 9:13 pm (et) Basecat: Will add, just look at how Slocum reacted when he heard about the fight on Day One...He would have been in command on the field before Meade showed up, and he most definitely did not want to be in that position.

10/23/2005 9:14 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, He did , after he was told his denials of the job would not be heard...;)

10/23/2005 9:14 pm (et) bluelady: To make a faulty move on your own soil could ruin your career.

10/23/2005 9:14 pm (et) ks: Second impression that came about shortly into the first chapter was that, perhaps this was a book Shaara read before writing TKA. Then I looked at publications dates and saw Shaara's preceded the Pfanz book. Boy, it read a lot like THE MOVIE.

10/23/2005 9:15 pm (et) mobile_96: Why would Slocum take over from Hancock.

10/23/2005 9:15 pm (et) Basecat: ks...Especially the meeting of Pete with Lee on Seminary Ridge...Just about the same dialogue from the MOVIE.

10/23/2005 9:15 pm (et) bluelady: He out ranked him mobile.

10/23/2005 9:15 pm (et) Basecat: Mobile...He ranked him.

10/23/2005 9:15 pm (et) mobile_96: By date?

10/23/2005 9:16 pm (et) bluelady: Yes I do believe.

10/23/2005 9:16 pm (et) mobile_96: He probably read Coddington.

10/23/2005 9:16 pm (et) Basecat: Plus, Hancock had ridden back to Taneytown, and once he did, Slocum also outranked Howard.

10/23/2005 9:17 pm (et) mobile_96: So that forced Slocum to take command, by Hancock leaving the field.

10/23/2005 9:17 pm (et) bluelady: Another thing is when Pfanz admits to more info on the Feds than the Rebs.. I am beginning to wonder about the new research out there now if that statement would hold water.

10/23/2005 9:17 pm (et) bluelady: Most likely mobile.

10/23/2005 9:17 pm (et) Basecat: Blue, which is a fine point, as notice he did not say that when writing his book on Day One.

10/23/2005 9:18 pm (et) Basecat: Mobile...Right, which is why he took his sweet time getting there.

10/23/2005 9:19 pm (et) bluelady: Yes makes you wonder if Ken Burns did the research people a favor with that documentary...people come out of the attic with their relics and some gems show up.

10/23/2005 9:19 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Egos showed themselves too - Hancock's method's of forcing his men to ford - suggesting it was due to his displeasure at Meade's promotion. Webb arresting an officer for crossing over a log - Gen Harrow arresting Col. Colvill because his troops broke ranks to cross. - Discipline is one thing, but this looks like big ego to me.

10/23/2005 9:20 pm (et) bluelady: amhg... That thing with Hancock was new to me.. I didn't think he was miffed at the Meade promotion before ..what about that? can anyone clear that up?

10/23/2005 9:21 pm (et) bluelady: I figured he was more miffed at not getting the orders from the clerk in a timely fashion.

10/23/2005 9:21 pm (et) amhistoryguy: It surprised me too - because later on it is mentioned how much Meade trusted Hancock.

10/23/2005 9:21 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, Bothered me as well when I read that, as it made the march sound like torture...Yeah, I know that speed was required to catch up, but that just ruined the troops with fatigue, and blisters etc. Pfanz makes a very good point as to how the marches of the various Union Corps were more difficult than what the Confederates were faced.

10/23/2005 9:21 pm (et) bluelady: But egos did play big on this battlefield.

10/23/2005 9:22 pm (et) amhistoryguy: The figure that of the 57th NY, only 27 of 175 men were present for duty after the march is kind of frightening.

10/23/2005 9:22 pm (et) bluelady: Remember reading All for the union.. EHR talked about the long 6th corps marches.

10/23/2005 9:23 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, especially when they new a battle was going on...Made no sense to me either., Especially when other corps were marching to the area at the same time.

10/23/2005 9:24 pm (et) bluelady: Now I think Pfanz did a good job of explaining why Meade did not go right to Gettysburg on July 1 until about 10 that night.

10/23/2005 9:25 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...I didn't like the explanation. To me he had no idea what to do, and was waffling about it. Again, once Reynolds is known to be dead, that's when he should have gone with Warren to Gettysburg. . .not wait until 10 PM.

10/23/2005 9:26 pm (et) Basecat: Will just add, if he could count on Hancock to go to Gettysburg for him, he could also have counted on him to bring up the rest of the corps to Gettysburg.

10/23/2005 9:27 pm (et) bluelady: Right, but I think him not knowing what the confederate army was going to do, the lack of communication with the 6th corps  and holding on to pipe creek until the last possible moment created the need for him to be there and go ahead and send a subordinate.

10/23/2005 9:28 pm (et) Basecat: Blue, and to me, that wasted time, as better to see for himself, than send a subordinate.

10/23/2005 9:28 pm (et) bluelady: Well, how could he have done that if Meade expected him to stay there and take command?

10/23/2005 9:29 pm (et) Basecat: But he didn't stay there, Hancock rode back to Taneytown area.

10/23/2005 9:29 pm (et) bluelady: Maybe but , and I know this is a what if and will say it anyway. . .who would be in control if Pipe creek was to be used?

10/23/2005 9:29 pm (et) bluelady: After things were more or less under control and Slocum was there.

10/23/2005 9:30 pm (et) Basecat: Hard to disengage 2 of your corps from a battle, where they suffered such casualties, and implement them into a position for battle in Maryland.. Battle had already started.

10/23/2005 9:31 pm (et) amhistoryguy: I thought that there was a bit of a contradiction in Lee's objective of going into Pennsylvania - on page 26 Longstreet reports that Lee said " The enemy is there and I am going to attack him there..." In Lee's after action report, mentioned on page 28, Lee says "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy.

10/23/2005 9:31 pm (et) bluelady: Very true and that goes to explain why lee stayed there to fight instead of following Longstreet's advice.

10/23/2005 9:31 pm (et) Basecat: Any more from Chapter One?? If not Let's move on to Chapter 2, and What the Army of Northern Virginia did as they marched towards Gettysburg.

10/23/2005 9:32 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Sorry I jumped the gun - the question of contradiction is from chapter 2.

10/23/2005 9:33 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, which is a major problem, but like Pfanz points out, hard to know just what was exactly said between those two at that time of Day One. Easy for Pete to say what Lee said, because when that was written Lee was long gone.

10/23/2005 9:33 pm (et) bluelady: Now was Hill's corps coming in from Chambersburg?

10/23/2005 9:33 pm (et) ks: I've been trying to find exactly what a "gill" is. Some definitions seem to imply it's a specific weight amount. Others make it seem to be just a water pot.

10/23/2005 9:33 pm (et) ks: You weren't the only gun jumper, AHG. :)

10/23/2005 9:33 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...Hill's Corps was coming from Cashtown.

10/23/2005 9:34 pm (et) Basecat: 8 miles west of Gettysburg.

10/23/2005 9:34 pm (et) bluelady: Ok, but were that also in Chambersburg before that?

10/23/2005 9:34 pm (et) mobile_96: 1 gill=1/4 pint

10/23/2005 9:34 pm (et) ks: As in Hood's men getting their whiskey ration, each man by dipping out his own gill.

10/23/2005 9:35 pm (et) Basecat: ks...Only Gill I know is named Vince...:) Tend to think in this case it meant the latter...water pot.

10/23/2005 9:35 pm (et) ks: THANK YOU, mo-beel! m-w.com was frustrating me there. :)

10/23/2005 9:35 pm (et) mobile_96: or 4 ounces

10/23/2005 9:35 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...Yep...

10/23/2005 9:36 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Just seems to me, that if Lee figures to go to Pennsylvania to gather supplies, and to relieve pressure on Virginia farms, getting into a major battle, even the result of contact, isn't the best course of action. - I don't think this view is hindsight.

10/23/2005 9:36 pm (et) ks: Maybe I should ask you my other very basic question that I managed to get through Day 1 without understanding. Where in the H is Marsh Creek?? I want specifics and my maps haven't show it. BTW the total lack of maps thus far was disappointing.

10/23/2005 9:36 pm (et) bluelady: Ok...then Ewell's corps was pretty well extended then if apart was almost to Harrisburg and the other part was in York.

10/23/2005 9:36 pm (et) ks: mobile, is that pronounced "jill" then? M-W seems to indicate it is.

10/23/2005 9:37 pm (et) Basecat: amhg...IMHO, that's what he told Davis to convince him to go North, but his real sights were set on defeating the AoP in the North.

10/23/2005 9:37 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...about 50 miles apart.

10/23/2005 9:37 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Marsh Creek is Just east of Gettysburg - The Gettysburg area was known as Marsh Creek early on.

10/23/2005 9:37 pm (et) bluelady: there are a lot more maps later in the book ks.

10/23/2005 9:38 pm (et) ks: Right. I said thus far, blue.

10/23/2005 9:38 pm (et) Basecat: And the creek meanders throughout the battlefield...in various directions.

10/23/2005 9:38 pm (et) ks: Just east....okay. Still trying to find it on a map. At least now I know where to look. Thank you.

10/23/2005 9:39 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Did Lee clear his movements with Davis on a regular basis?

10/23/2005 9:40 pm (et) amhistoryguy: ks, Marsh Creek is a small creek to the east.

10/23/2005 9:40 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, He kept Davis well informed as to what he was gonna do with the army...unlike what Johnston did on the Peninsula.

10/23/2005 9:40 pm (et) jimtno: Ok. I don't think he persay "cleared his movements" with Davis. He did communicate with Richmond though.

10/23/2005 9:41 pm (et) Basecat: ks...look at the map on page 120.

10/23/2005 9:41 pm (et) amhistoryguy: I guess I don't understand why Lee would tell Davis he was going to take pressure off Virginia and to get supplies, when he really meant to destroy the AoP.

10/23/2005 9:43 pm (et) bluelady: I truly think his idea first was to destroy that army but then to sell the idea he had to come up with the other reason politically.

10/23/2005 9:43 pm (et) jimtno: AMG, Everything I have ever read on this campaign, indicates Lee's plans were two fold. Relieve pressure from Virginia and Destroy the AOP.

10/23/2005 9:44 pm (et) mobile_96: Because Davis wanted him to send troops to Miss, to take pressure off Vicksburg, and Lee didn't want to part with any of his men.

10/23/2005 9:45 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, I think it was always implied by Davis and Lee, that the main objective was to strike a blow at the AoP, and winning a battle above the Mason-Dixon Line, would help the Confederacy's political standing with the rest of the world.

10/23/2005 9:45 pm (et) jimtno: Mobile Actually it was not only Davis's idea but "Old Pete" suggested troops be sent from the ANV to Miss. Then relented.

10/23/2005 9:45 pm (et) amhistoryguy: I would agree that that seems to be the plan, I don't understand why he would tell Davis otherwise. -- Ok mobile, that makes sense - to maintain his army.

10/23/2005 9:45 pm (et) Basecat: Mobile...Pete wanted him to send troops out west as well, and had talks with Davis about this as well.

10/23/2005 9:46 pm (et) mobile_96: Agree jim, forgot about Pete.

10/23/2005 9:46 pm (et) ks: That's 50 pages ahead of schedule, but much appreciated, Basecat.

10/23/2005 9:46 pm (et) jimtno: BTW. . .my impression is that Lee felt that if he sent them to VB, he would lose them permanently.

10/23/2005 9:47 pm (et) bluelady: Jim and he was probably right there.

10/23/2005 9:48 pm (et) Basecat: amhg...It was described that way not for Davis's benefit, but for the rest of his cabinet as most of them were against him going North at all. Davis was on the same page as Lee, IMHO.

10/23/2005 9:48 pm (et) jimtno: I don't want to get off the book, but Emory Thomas alludes to that in his Bio on Lee.

10/23/2005 9:49 pm (et) bluelady: Also stated near the end of the chapter Pfanz used the writings and testimony of lee's staff to discredit the attacks by Early and company about the early morning attack.

10/23/2005 9:49 pm (et) Basecat: And we are ranging far away from Chapter 2...so let's get the focus back on that..:)

10/23/2005 9:49 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Ok, I get it - don't want to sidetrack the discussion.

10/23/2005 9:50 pm (et) jimtno: Sorry Base.

10/23/2005 9:50 pm (et) Basecat: Blue, That's why you have to take Early's speeches after the war as his way of casting blame for the loss far from himself. Early would have had no clue if Lee wanted to attack at dawn, and he in fact convinced him that they could not do so.

10/23/2005 9:51 pm (et) Basecat: Before the attack plans were drawn up, I should add.

10/23/2005 9:52 pm (et) Basecat: Fremantle comparing Gettysburg area to Surrey in England made me snicker a bit...Lots of places in this country must look exactly like the terrain in England..:)

10/23/2005 9:52 pm (et) bluelady: Right but it still amazes me how many people still believed his hindsight thoughts.. especially after Lee was dead.

10/23/2005 9:52 pm (et) jimtno: Base, Wasn't Early present at the early morning meeting?

10/23/2005 9:52 pm (et) bluelady: Especially in Pennsylvania! :)

10/23/2005 9:53 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, yep, and that's the point I was making, he told Lee that no way could an attack at dawn on his sector of the field could be done to any advantage...This was long before Lee had made up the official orders for Day 2.

10/23/2005 9:54 pm (et) Basecat: Then years later he said Lee wanted to attack at dawn, which is true, but he left out the fact that He talked him out of it..:)

10/23/2005 9:54 pm (et) mobile_96: Blue, the arguments were started after Lee was gone, so they couldn't be contradicted.

10/23/2005 9:55 pm (et) jimtno: Folks, I am one of those who feel the key to understanding what takes place on day 2 is understanding that morning meeting and Johnson's return.

10/23/2005 9:55 pm (et) bluelady: Talk about egos and saving face.

10/23/2005 9:55 pm (et) bluelady: Exactly mobile.

10/23/2005 9:55 pm (et) jimtno: Bl, Thats one thing Early did not lack.. Ego.

10/23/2005 9:56 pm (et) bluelady: Amen there Jim.

10/23/2005 9:56 pm (et) Basecat: Anymore on Chapter 2?

10/23/2005 9:56 pm (et) Basecat: On to Chapter 3, and the rest of the Union Army's approach to Gettysburg.

10/23/2005 9:57 pm (et) jimtno: AH yes Henry Slowwwcum! :-)

10/23/2005 9:57 pm (et) bluelady: The controversial Pipe Creek circular.

10/23/2005 9:58 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, as good a place as any to start from...as is the Pipe Creek Circular. :)

10/23/2005 9:59 pm (et) jimtno: Ah yes true and there lies the problems with Sickles, Slowwwwwcum. At least Old Dan marches to the sounds of the guns. Go figure.

10/23/2005 9:59 pm (et) Basecat: On the Pipe Creek Circular, this adds to my thought that Meade was waffling as to what to do...He stays behind, and sent Hancock in his place to GB, because he has no clue what Lee is doing, and yet he thinks Lee will attack him and give battle at Pipe Creek. How would he know that Lee would attack him there?

10/23/2005 9:59 pm (et) bluelady: And old Henry didn't want to get there to end up taking control.

10/23/2005 10:00 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, which Harry rightly points out, and probably the one thing Danny boy did right that week, IMHO.

10/23/2005 10:00 pm (et) bluelady: Base he didn't know that.. but in my opinion he was keeping his options open until the last min.

10/23/2005 10:01 pm (et) jimtno: Bl, I think the Pipe Creek becomes a crutch for a ton of excuses including Henry Slocum.

10/23/2005 10:01 pm (et) Basecat: Blue, which is the point I am trying to make. Hard to know what Lee is doing when you are in Maryland, and Lee is in Pennsylvania.

10/23/2005 10:01 pm (et) ks: That's the impression I had from reading Pfanz, blue. That of keeping options open, I mean.

10/23/2005 10:01 pm (et) jimtno: For HS.

10/23/2005 10:01 pm (et) amhistoryguy: I found it interesting that it is mentioned that both Lee and Meade felt that they were "forced" into battle.

10/23/2005 10:02 pm (et) Basecat: amhg...Which is an excellent point. Both really had no control of what took place on Day one...and just reacted to it as best they could.

10/23/2005 10:02 pm (et) bluelady: And maybe he figured that if lee was going to make it to Washington, he would have to come back that way to get there? Now that is just a guess...and the fact that the Susquehanna can be a very big barrier to the east as well.

10/23/2005 10:03 pm (et) jimtno: KS, the problems with two corps committed at Gettysburg, two full brigades of Cavalry at Gettysburg, one commander who he trusted tells him I am going to fight to hold the height and fight back through town if I have to. At that point me thinks its time to get your butt to GB!

10/23/2005 10:03 pm (et) Basecat: ks...Am all for keeping options open, but those options dwindled once he learns Reynolds has been killed.

10/23/2005 10:04 pm (et) ks: And hindsight is 20/20, isn't it? ;)

10/23/2005 10:04 pm (et) amhistoryguy: It doesn't seem that when they reacted, that they reacted with any amount of caution. Both seemed willing to go "all in" without knowing what was in their hand.

10/23/2005 10:05 pm (et) jimtno: OK, The question I have if your are still hanging on to Pipe Creek, why send a 2nd in seniority Corp commander to take over AND your Chief of engineers! ... Hmmmmm I call that calling on the river card.

10/23/2005 10:05 pm (et) bluelady: lol ks yes it is...but then what about your other 5 corps...most of whom were still near your HQ?...seems to me stay until you are committed.

10/23/2005 10:05 pm (et) Basecat: amhg, and yet both were cautious at the start...especially on Meade's part, as he sure changed his mind rather quickly.

10/23/2005 10:06 pm (et) ks: Calling on the river card? No comprende, Jim.

10/23/2005 10:06 pm (et) bluelady: Jim to be sure if you are going to call on the river?

10/23/2005 10:06 pm (et) Basecat: and leave the two corps to fend for themselves?

10/23/2005 10:06 pm (et) bluelady: Texas hold em poker ks

10/23/2005 10:06 pm (et) ks: Greek to me, blue. Gracias. ;)

10/23/2005 10:07 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Would it be safe to say that Meade had less to lose than Lee?

10/23/2005 10:07 pm (et) jimtno: Texas hold em. One card still to be played, but it also means you are committed to your hand. Once Meade sends Hancock, and also Warren along with what's already in GB along what's happened. No choice is left .. Get the rest to GB, and get your butt to GB. ASAP.

10/23/2005 10:07 pm (et) bluelady: Or by sending the 2 commanders to find out if it worth staying base?

10/23/2005 10:08 pm (et) Basecat: amhg..More, IMHO...Losing up North would have been a devastating blow to the Union war effort.

10/23/2005 10:08 pm (et) Basecat: Blue You just answered your own question. Had he gone himself, he would have had to make up his own mind.

10/23/2005 10:09 pm (et) jimtno: What finishes it in my opinion is Sickles reaction. Marches to the guns.

10/23/2005 10:09 pm (et) bluelady: And there is one thing that we really didn't mention yet... and this is just a question... how long would it normally take a new commander to know what his army is up to at this time?

10/23/2005 10:10 pm (et) Basecat: Jim, but then what does Danny boy do?? Asks Meade if he should go back to Emmittsburg area..;)

10/23/2005 10:10 pm (et) jimtno: And as hard its it for me to admit it, at least as Base alludes to, he does do the right thing there. (Gag cough cough).

10/23/2005 10:11 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...He was a Corps Commander, before he got the job, and would have known from Hooker where the rest of the army was.

10/23/2005 10:11 pm (et) bluelady: Ok Basecat but then he would not have had that option to fold the hand and fall back to that line...looking at it in hindsight that would not be a wise move but maybe at the time...?

10/23/2005 10:11 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Excellent point bluelady - how well did Meade understand what kind of an army he had - the capabilities of his subordinates?

10/23/2005 10:12 pm (et) Basecat: Really am not looking at this using hindsight at all...just think he did not react correctly to what was going on at the time.

10/23/2005 10:12 pm (et) amhistoryguy: That was my thought bluelady - fall back to assess the situation.

10/23/2005 10:12 pm (et) jimtno: My thinking there is BL, if he does that he loses all confidence of the rest of the Army. And believe it or not there was a section that wanted Little Mac back. Sighhh

10/23/2005 10:12 pm (et) bluelady: And the corps commanders were kept up to date on the positions of the other corps? just a question.. I really don't know

10/23/2005 10:13 pm (et) Basecat: Meade was with the AoP from the start, and had an idea about the capabilities of officers in the army.

10/23/2005 10:13 pm (et) mobile_96: Or how well they would 'follow' his orders.

10/23/2005 10:13 pm (et) Basecat: Blue...In this case, yes, as he would be privy to any marching orders from Hooker as to what roads the other corps would be taking etc.

10/23/2005 10:14 pm (et) jimtno: The only one I would have my doubts about would have been Sickles. Meade did not like old Danny boy, and the feeling was mutual.

10/23/2005 10:14 pm (et) bluelady: Ok was wondering about that.

10/23/2005 10:14 pm (et) amhistoryguy: The rumors of the return of Mac, and the reaction to the rumors showed some real division in the AoP, I thought.

10/23/2005 10:15 pm (et) bluelady: And that continued almost to the end of the war. Lincoln worried about the soldier vote in the 1864 election because of that very thing.

10/23/2005 10:15 pm (et) Basecat: amhg...Surprises me that even in 1863, Little Mac was still the fave of all the commanders of the AoP.

10/23/2005 10:15 pm (et) ks: All?

10/23/2005 10:16 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Perhaps even Meade would not have minded the return of Mac as commander?

10/23/2005 10:16 pm (et) jimtno: The interesting thing is Portor Farley wrote (140th NY ) that he thought Mac was the worst commander the Army ever had. That's from another book I am reading write now btw.

10/23/2005 10:17 pm (et) Basecat: In the ranks ks...They did not like Burnside, got mad at Hooker.

10/23/2005 10:17 pm (et) bluelady: Most of the army officers were considered as they are today conservatives...and Mac was definitely that.

10/23/2005 10:17 pm (et) Basecat: Meade was not a Little Mac man...and don't think he would have liked that choice at all.

10/23/2005 10:18 pm (et) jimtno: The interesting thing is that as you read about other officers, men who were thought to be "Mac" men, were not by now,. See one G.K. Warren. Though this will follow him till April 1,1865.

10/23/2005 10:18 pm (et) Basecat: amhg...IMHO...Meade would have rather Reynolds got the job after Hooker was relieved.

10/23/2005 10:19 pm (et) bluelady: and IIRC the reason Reynolds did NOT take it was because of the limitations Washington put on the AoP.

10/23/2005 10:20 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Thanks Basecat, it will take me a while to get up to speed on some of the relationships between these eastern commanders.

10/23/2005 10:20 pm (et) jimtno: BL and there you have the full tale of that story.

10/23/2005 10:21 pm (et) Basecat: amhg...That's why the AoP was not successful this part of the war...too many factions inside the officer corps, IMHO.

10/23/2005 10:21 pm (et) bluelady: Yep...and G G Meade ends up being the last commander of the AoP.

10/23/2005 10:21 pm (et) Teej Smith: OK if I add something here?

10/23/2005 10:21 pm (et) Basecat: Add away Teej.

10/23/2005 10:21 pm (et) bluelady: And its limitations as well basecat

10/23/2005 10:22 pm (et) Basecat: Blue, Very true.

10/23/2005 10:22 pm (et) Teej Smith: In a discussion on another discussion group there was some question as to whether Lincoln ever really offered Reynolds the top spot.

10/23/2005 10:22 pm (et) amhistoryguy: Did the pressure of not only commanding an army in the field, but being responsible for the defense of Washington as well - hamstring the AoP commanders?

10/23/2005 10:23 pm (et) bluelady: Most definitely amhg.

10/23/2005 10:23 pm (et) Teej Smith: IMO, absolutely.

10/23/2005 10:23 pm (et) Basecat: Teej, which is true, as I can't find a source that says he was offered the job.

10/23/2005 10:23 pm (et) mobile_96: Would think it would have to amhg.

10/23/2005 10:24 pm (et) Basecat: Homework next week is chapters 4, 5, and 6. A reminder, Monday Book chat is on a two week break and will reconvene first Monday in November.

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